Abstract-This paper proposes a cooperative demand response scheme for price-anticipating buildings in smart grid. The cooperative demand response scheme is formulated as a constrained social optimization problem. We develop a cooperative strategy and obtain a Pareto-optimal solution from the constrained social optimization problem. Comparing with the Nash equilibrium obtained from the one-stage demand management game, the Pareto-optimal solution reduces the electricity costs to all the building managers. We further align this Pareto-optimal solution with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated demand management game and develop an incentive-compatible triggerand-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behavior of the building managers. Numerical results demonstrate that the cooperative demand response scheme can reduce the electricity costs, the electricity price, and the total energy consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response is defined as the changes in electric usage by end-use consumers in response to the power grid needs from electricity markets [1] . In general, there are two categories of demand response schemes: incentive-based scheme and pricebased scheme. For the direct load control in the incentivebased scheme, the control center manages the load of the participating consumers directly [2] , [3] . For the price-based scheme, the control center can adjust the load by flexible pricing, such as critical peak pricing and real-time pricing [4] . An advanced metering infrastructure is used for collecting the energy consumption and announcing the electricity price [5] .
There are two types of consumers in the literature of price-based demand response scheme: price-taking consumers [6] - [8] and price-anticipating consumers [9] - [15] . The pricetaking consumers consider that their energy consumption cannot affect the electricity price, whereas the price-anticipating consumers believe that their energy consumption can change the electricity price. In fact, the price-anticipating consumers are usually referred to the large energy consumers such as commercial buildings. It was proved that the commercial buildings have large potential to provide demand response to the smart grid [16] , [17] .
Recently, game theory has been applied to study the demand response of price-anticipating consumers. For example, the noncooperative game was utilized to study the cost minimization of interactive consumers [9] , [10] , the charging control of plug-in electric vehicles [11] - [13] . Stackelberg game was employed to model the interactions between the consumers and the utility companies [14] , [15] . However, neither the Nash equilibrium nor the Stackelberg equilibrium of the these game models are Pareto-optimal solutions. Generally, Pareto optimality is an important criterion for evaluating economic systems and public policies. If economic allocation in any system is not Pareto efficient, there is potential for a Pareto improvement-an increase in Pareto efficiency. Nevertheless, few papers are devoted to the Pareto improvement for the demand response strategy. In this study, we study the cooperative demand response of price-anticipating commercial buildings and give a Pareto-optimal demand response strategy such that all the building managers have lower electricity costs at this strategy compared with that at the Nash equilibrium.
The novelties of this work are twofold. First, we formulate the cooperative demand response as a social optimization problem and prove that the solution in this optimization problem is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated demand management game. Second, we develop a incentive-compatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behavior of the building managers and establish the condition on the duration of the punishment. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature providing rigorous analysis of Pareto improvement in demand response.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is built in Section II. In Section III, the cooperative demand response strategy is developed, and the social optimal solution is proved to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. A incentive-compatible trigger-and-punishment mechanism is developed to avoid the noncooperative behavior of the building managers. Numerical results are shown in Section IV, and conclusions are summarized in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a demand management system composed of a control center and several buildings, as shown in Fig. 1 . The control center can adjust the energy consumption of the buildings by periodically announcing the price to the building managers. We assume that the building managers are priceanticipating consumers, i.e., the building managers know that the price is affected by their energy consumption. According to the updated electricity price, the building managers can adjust the temperature settings of the heating ventilation air conditioning (HVAC) system to reduce their electricity costs. The electricity costs are composed of two aspects: the costs caused by the discomfort and the payments. Next, we will give the formulations for these two costs.
A. Discomfort costs
For buildings with HVAC systems, changing the temperature settings will cause discomfort to the occupants. The discomfort costs are defined as the following Taguchi loss function [18] :
where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the set of building managers, i denotes the index of building manager, t denotes the index of time slot, and θ i is the cost coefficient.T in i (t) and T in i (t) denote the target indoor temperature and the actual indoor temperature in time slot t, respectively. The indoor temperature of building i evolves according to the following linear dynamics [8] : (2) where β i and γ i specify the thermal characteristics of the operating environment and the HVAC system, T out i denotes the outdoor temperature, β(T
) models the heat transfer, γl i (t) models the energy-heat transformation of the HVAC: γ i > 0 if the HVAC is a heater and γ i < 0 if the HVAC is a cooler. Assuming building i requiresl i (t) kWh energy to maintain the target indoor temperature, we havê
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and omitting the time slot t, we obtain the discomfort costs:
B. Electricity payments
The electricity payments of building manager i are denoted as
where l = {l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l N }. According to the technical report from U. S. Department of Energy [1] , the electricity price are approximated to a linear function of the total energy consumption.
where L is the forecast demand, λ is the pricing parameter to implement elastic pricing, and p 0 is the base price when the actual total energy consumption is equal to L.
C. Electricity Costs
The electricity cost to building manager i is defined as
The discomfort costs and the electricity payments usually conflict with each other, and the building managers need to make a tradeoff between them.
III. MAIN RESULTS

A. Game Formulation and Cooperative Strategy
From the cost formulation (7), the energy consumption of the building managers will change the electricity price and further affect the electricity costs to the other building managers. Thus, the demand management can be formulated as the following noncooperative game:
Definition 1. (One-stage demand management game) A demand management game is defined as a triple
G = {N , (S i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N }, where N = {1, 2, · · · ,
N} is the set of active building managers participating in the game, S i is the set of possible strategies that building manager i can take, and
is the payoff function.
The stable solution of the one-stage demand management game is the Nash equilibrium, which can be obtained from
The coefficient matrix of the above equations is denoted as
Following the Gerschgorin theorem [19] , the coefficient matrix is nonsingular if
with which, the Nash equilibrium is unique and can be denoted as
where C is defined as
. . .
Generally, the Nash equilibrium is not a Pareto-optimal solution, and there exist possibilities to increase the payoffs of all the building managers simultaneously. Next, we develop a cooperative strategy to improve the Pareto efficiency. Specifically, the building managers negotiate their energy consumption according to the following social optimization problem:
where U is not smaller than U e i for all i ∈ N. However, the social optimal energy consumption is not achievable in one-stage demand response because all the building managers can improve their payoffs by taking the noncooperative strategy and the noncooperative behavior will not affect their future payoffs. To make the social optimal energy consumption achievable, we need to give some punishments to the building managers in the future if they adopt the noncooperative strategy. In that case, the building managers will play the one-stage demand management game repeatedly and care more about the longterm electricity costs. The average electricity cost to building manager i over multiple stages is defined as
where k is the index of the stage and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, which represents how the building managers discount their future costs. In that case, the building managers not only value the current electricity costs but also the future electricity costs. Therefore, each building manager will keep a good reputation to avoid the increased cost in the future. Next, we give the definition of the repeated demand management game. 
is the average payoff function.
According to the Folk theorem [20] , there exits a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated demand management game such that the average payoffŪ i is equal to the cooperative payoff U c i for all i ∈ N when δ >δ, whereδ is a threshold to ensure the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
B. Trigger-and-Punishment Mechanism
In this section, we will develop a trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behavior and prove that the social optimal energy consumption is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated demand management game. Before that, we first characterize the impact of the noncooperative behavior on the demand management system.
1) Impact of the noncooperative behavior:
We assume only one building manager i takes the noncooperative strategy when the other building managers adopt the cooperative strategy. In that case, the energy consumption of building manager i is denoted as
from which, we obtain
The payoff of building manager i obtained from the noncooperative strategy is denoted as
and the payoff of the other building managers are denoted as
where
) denotes the price in the case of noncooperative behavior and is defined as
It is straightforward to see that the building manager can improve its payoff by taking the noncooperative strategy, i.e., U
In the cooperative demand response scheme, the noncooperative behavior of one building manager will change the electricity price, the total energy consumption, and the payoffs of the other building managers. Next, we will study the impacts of the nonlinear behavior on the performance of demand response scheme.
Proposition 1. Suppose one building manager takes the noncooperative strategy while the other building managers keep cooperative, we have the following conclusions:
• The electricity price (p d (l Proof: Following the social optimality of (P1), we have
, at least one building manager will have the payoff decrease. Suppose the payoff of building manager j (j ∈ N , j = i) is decreased. Since the energy consumption of the building manager j is not changed, the decrease of the payoff function (17) only comes from the increase of the payments and thus the increase of the electricity price. Given the increased electricity price and the unchanged energy consumption, the other building managers that keep cooperative will also have the payoff decrease. From the pricing function (6), we see that the increase of the price only comes from the increase of the total energy consumption and thus the increase of the energy consumption of the noncooperative building manager.
In practice, the changes in the price, the payoffs, and the total energy consumption are related to the scale of the demand management system (e.g., the number of buildings). In the simulations, we will discuss it in detail. To avoid the noncooperative behavior of the selfish building managers, we develop the following trigger-and-punishment mechanism: All of the building managers are assumed to adopt the cooperative strategy in the first stage. In the subsequent stages (i.e., k ≥ 2), the building manager will maintain the cooperative strategy if all the other building managers adopt the cooperative strategy in the last stage. If the control center sees a noncooperative behavior in the last stage, he will announce the start of punishment. All of the building managers choose the noncooperative strategy for the subsequent T stages and restart cooperation at the T + 1 stage. There are two questions to be answered in the trigger-and-punishment mechanism: How to identify the noncooperative behavior in the demand management system and what is the punishment strength to avoid the noncooperative behavior?
2) Noncooperative Behavior Detection: The changes of the total energy consumption, the electricity price, and the payoffs can be used for detecting the nonlinear behavior of the building managers. Next, we choose the change of the total energy consumption as the indicator for noncooperative behavior. The change of the total energy consumption is defined as (19) To detect the noncooperative behavior of any building manager, the detection threshold is chosen as
where l d i is the energy consumption of the building manager that adopts the noncooperative strategy and l c i is the energy consumption of the building manager that adopts the cooperative strategy. The detection rule is denoted aŝ
whereq = 1 denotes that the control center detects noncooperative behavior in the demand management system and q = 0 denotes that the control center does not detect the noncooperative behavior.
3) Punishment Strategy: Assuming all the building managers adopt the cooperative strategy, the average payoff of the building manager i without noncooperative behavior is denoted asŪ
and the average payoff of the building manager i with noncooperative behavior at stage T 0 is denoted as
Next, we give the conditions to achieve the social optimal energy consumption in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The social optimal energy consumption l c is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated demand management game G(∞, δ), and the trigger-and-punishment mechanism is incentive compatible if
where δ should satisfy
Proof: To align the social optimal energy consumption with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and achieve the incentive compatibility of the trigger-and-punishment mechanism, there should beŪ 
Following the definition of repeated game, U Then, we obtain the condition (24). The lower bound of δ is obtained from
from which, we obtain the condition (25). It is shown that the minimal duration of punishment is not related to the stage at which the noncooperative behavior occurs. No matter which stages the game start from, the social optimal energy consumption is still a equilibrium of the subgame and thus a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated demand management game.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the cooperative demand response scheme by using Monte Carlo method. We assume that the target energy consumption of the buildings are uniformly distributed in [100kWh, 150kWh], the cost coefficients γ i θ 2 i are uniformly distributed in [2, 4] . The base price p 0 is set to 5 cents/kWh, the forecast demand is estimated by L = i∈Nl i /1.5, and the pricing parameter a is calculated by a = 2/N . Before giving the numerical results, we first define the performance indexes as follows.
To evaluate the cost reduction of the building managers obtained from the cooperative demand response scheme, we define the average cost reduction (ACR) as
To evaluate the cost reduction of the building manager i that adopts the noncooperative strategy, we define the average cost reduction of the building manager that has the noncooperative behavior (CRN) as
To evaluate the cost increase of the cooperative building managers when the building manager i adopts the noncooperative strategy, we define the average cost increase of the cooperative building managers due to the noncooperative behavior (CIN) as
We compare the cooperative and noncooperative demand response schemes in Table 1 . It is shown that the cooperation reduces the electricity price, the total costs, the average costs, and the total energy consumption effectively. Next, we study the impact of the number of the buildings on the performance Average cost reduction of the building manager that has the noncooperative behavior v.s. Number of building managers.
of the demand response scheme. As shown in Fig. 2 , the average cost reduction obtained from the cooperation is increased with the number of the buildings and starts to saturate when the number of buildings is larger than 100. Assuming one building manager has the noncooperative behavior and the other building managers keep cooperative, the average cost reduction of the noncooperative building manager is increased with the number of the buildings, and the average cost increase of the other cooperative building managers are decreased with the number of the buildings, as shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . Both of them start to saturate when there are more than 100 buildings. It is also shown that the noncooperative building manager has relatively large cost reduction and thus strong motivation to take the noncooperative strategy.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we formulate the cooperative demand response scheme as a constrained social optimization problem. It is shown that the cooperative demand response scheme reduces the electricity price, the total costs, the average costs, and the total energy consumption comparing with the noncooperative demand response scheme. We use the repeated game to keep cooperative among selfish price-anticipating building managers and develop the trigger-and-punishment mechanism to avoid the noncooperative behavior. We establish the condition on the duration of punishment to guarantee a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and incentive compatibility.
